New Threats and New Responses

The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control, Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, eds. (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1999). 202 pp., cloth (ISBN: 1-57003-301-3), $39.95.

Deadly Transfers and the Global Playground: Transnational Security Threats in a Disorderly World, Robert Mandel (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). 139 pp., cloth (ISBN: 0-275-96228-8), $55.00.

How can we best respond to the major security threats the nations of the world will face in coming decades? The books by Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff and by Robert Mandel provide different but equally provocative answers to this question. Bernauer, Ruloff, and their co-authors provide a compelling examination of the conditions under which positive incentives can do better than deterrent threats at decreasing the propensity of states to acquire or retain nuclear weapons.

Mandel provides a more wide-ranging argument aimed at identifying the new set of threats posed by globalization trends from nonstate actors to national and international security. He argues that existing responses are inadequate and that an effective response to these new challenges requires a policy reorientation focused on changing a broad range of individual attitudes regarding these threats. Both books question the efficacy of traditional deterrence-based strategies to respond to the major threats states will face in the new millennium.

Bernauer and Ruloff's book provides a careful, well-argued analysis of the as yet understudied use of positive incentives to promote international cooperation. Increasing evidence has shown that sanctions work only under certain, arguably limited, conditions and, even then, "only lead to a short-term change of preferences and not a genuine change of interests" (p. 21). The editors provide an extremely useful analytic framework that neatly identifies both the promise and the risks of adopting a strategy of offering side payments or compensation in exchange for appropriate changes in policy (p. 34).

Other scholars have begun to recognize that policymakers have often sought to "buy" appropriate policies in arms control, trade, environmental affairs,

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and even human rights. Although *The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control* focuses on the use of positive incentives in the security realm, particularly in horizontal nuclear proliferation, the introduction and concluding chapters provide a valuable theoretical framework for all those scholars seeking to evaluate the effectiveness of such strategies in any area of international cooperation.

The authors demonstrate that positive incentives have the potential to produce significant behavioral changes in the short term, inducing far less antagonism than sanctions while fostering more stable solutions to the problem in the longer term. Jozef Goldblat examines multilateral nuclear, biological, and chemical arms control; Amy E. Smithson looks at efforts to halt North Korea's nuclear program; and Thomas Bernauer, Stefan Brem, and Roy Suter analyze the denuclearization of the Ukraine.

The Ukraine case provides particularly compelling evidence of how positive incentives produced "one of the great successes in recent arms control history," a success that simply would not have been possible by threatening sanctions. Yet both the Ukraine and North Korea cases also demonstrate the major risks that such strategies run. Both the providers and recipients of side payments need to worry about the other side reneging on the bargain. Those offered rewards to alter their behavior quickly recognize the value of not altering that behavior as a bargaining chip (p. 138). The authors provide strong empirical support for their theoretical predictions that rewards will evoke extortion and moral hazard problems among potential recipients (pp. 166–167). At the same time, their studies draw our attention to the reciprocal problems of incentive providers. In the Ukraine case, Russia, the United States, and other Western nations have provided less financial assistance more slowly than originally promised. North Korea appears to have faced fewer such problems because it still retains the option of reinitiating its proliferation efforts as a bargaining chip. In short, Bernauer, Ruloff, and their colleagues provide a compelling yet nicely nuanced delineation of the conditions under which positive incentives can aid those seeking to foster international cooperation and the caution they need to exercise in employing them.

If Bernauer and Ruloff highlight the problems of using deterrence to address the well-accepted threat posed by nuclear proliferation, Mandel draws our attention to a range of new threats to national and international security. Mandel argues convincingly that the decentralization of authority, characteristic of growing trends in interdependence and globalization, has a dark side. Using the public playground as metaphor, Mandel notes that globalization has increased the ability of "bullies and ruffians" to threaten the biological, political, and socioeconomic survival of the state, while it has decreased the effectiveness of playground "monitors" to constrain and prevent such threats. The reduced control over interstate transfers, requisite to facilitating trade in legitimate goods and services, has increased the opportunities for "rogue" states, terrorist groups,

criminal organizations, and deviant individuals to infiltrate and infect societies with "deadly transfers."

Mandel uses his first three and last three chapters to develop a theoretical framework that lays out the intractable causes of these problems, their potentially devastating consequences, and the futility of existing policy responses. Illegal arms and drug sales, unsanctioned immigration and hazardous material flows, and transborder infections of human health and information systems cause obvious direct harm to individuals and states. Yet Mandel makes the more provocative claim that these deadly transfers threaten system structure and lead to the "gradual disintegration of global order" (p. 29)

In a perverse case of the whole being worse than the sum of its parts, Mandel argues that, as a group, these "ominous transnational flows" are causing a dramatic systemwide increase in violence, a reduction in the strength of civil society, and an increased threat from internal, as opposed to external, disruptions to society (p. 30). For the individual, they produce an increased sense of vulnerability, cynicism, distrust, and xenophobia (pp. 30–31). The increase in deadly transfers that cause these systemic and individual declines results from both permissive systemic causes and more proximate individual precipitants. Advanced transport and communication technologies make borders increasingly porous; transnational nongovernmental groups have increasing influence over global outcomes; and the global marketplace facilitates the prompt satisfaction of material desires (pp. 26–27).

While most authors highlight the benefits of these trends, Mandel sounds cautionary notes: "removing borders" makes illicit as well as licit transfers easier; nonstate actors may seek evil as well as virtuous ends; satisfying material desires may reduce human solidarities and connections, as well as increase human well-being (p. 28). Growing norms in support of freedom and individualism have coupled with increasing alienation, anger, and material self-gratification, which increase the incentives to participate in illegal transfers while removing forces at the individual and societal levels that traditionally have inhibited their expression (p. 28). Mandel uses six internal chapters to briefly delineate the scope of the problem, the recent history, and the security implications of each of his six deadly transfers.

Governments are not always the mere unwilling victims of those who seek to promote the trade in arms, drugs, hazardous waste, and other deadly transfers. Corrupt governments, subversive groups, and greedy individuals can facilitate the efforts of the "unruly perpetrators" of these problems (p. 5). Even the governments representing societies, corporations, and individuals that are involuntary victims often have policies that reflect ambivalent and inconsistent (and at times hypocritical) goals (p. 87). Many governments have incentives to promote and prevent covert arms sales and to ignore illegal immigration that benefits economic growth. Despite expressions of grave concern about illegal drugs, the hazardous waste trade, infectious diseases, and disruptions of defense and

corporate information systems, governments have dedicated only limited resources to the efforts to attack these problems (pp. 88–90). Whereas national governments generally lack the political will to take action to reverse these trends, international and nongovernmental organizations tend to lack the capacity to take effective action.

Mandel not only sees little commitment to reversing these trends, but also considers the tools traditionally being used as ineffective. Paralleling Bernauer and Ruloff, Mandel argues that deterrent-based policies have become increasingly less effective in the post–Cold War context, and that they are particularly ineffective at addressing deadly transfers involving ambiguous threats to a state's security from dispersed sources that are often difficult to "pin down, apprehend, and punish" (p. 35). Turning to governments, international organizations, or nongovernmental organizations will fail because these actors lack the motivation, ability, or effective tools to combat the growing problem of deadly transfers.

Instead, Mandel proposes "a much more challenging strategy—actually changing the incentives facing many players on the global playground so that they no longer see as much utility in engaging in the deadly transfers" (p. 112). In providing a self-admittedly preliminary and general outline of how such a strategy might work, Mandel focuses on the import of cognitive strategies that make actors aware of the "broad negative effects of their behavior on society" to induce a deeper normative transformation "such that only a minority of the players consistently want to misbehave" (pp. 113–114).

Both these books focus our attention on the security threats we will face in the years ahead and the need for innovative policy approaches if we are going to address them effectively. Mandel primarily seeks to heighten our awareness of a new set of national and international security threats that constitute the dark underside of globalization. He also proposes a strategy of long-term and innovative commitment to inducing deep transformation in how individuals understand their interests and the effects of their behaviors on the larger social system. Such an investment is likely to require much time before it pays off. In contrast, Bernauer, Ruloff, and their colleagues focus on the more traditional and well-accepted security threats posed by weapons proliferation, particularly nuclear proliferation, and carefully examine the conditions under which positive incentives can provide effective policies for addressing the pressures for acquisition of such weapons. They demonstrate that positive incentives, if developed through policies self-conscious of their many potential pitfalls, could provide a nearer-term solution to immediate security threats, which may contribute to the deeper transformation of interests and integration of actors into international society that Mandel seeks to foster.

Mandel's book challenges us to think more creatively about how we approach security problems. He urges us to eschew the traditional reliance on government-initiated changes in system structure and security policy and to

adopt a more unorthodox approach based on societally initiated changes in individual attitudes. Bernauer and Ruloff's book challenges us to think more systematically and analytically about all our efforts to promote international cooperation. Successfully addressing future security threats will undoubtedly require both skills.

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